my point of view on Augustine's theory最好是针对他对evil的理解的英文的谢谢

my point of view on Augustine's theory最好是针对他对evil的理解的英文的谢谢
my point of view on Augustine's theory
最好是针对他对evil的理解的
英文的
谢谢

my point of view on Augustine's theory最好是针对他对evil的理解的英文的谢谢
Augustine and Evil
Saint Augustine was both a Platonist and a Christian. (More precisely, the Bishop of Hippo was most influenced by Plotinus, the founder of Neo-Platonism, but that is a technicality to ignore in an essay this brief.) As a Christian, Augustine accepted the following argument:
All things were created by God. So, all things are good, since God, being perfectly good, only creates that which is good.
But this left Augustine with the philosophical question: Where does evil come from? If all things were originally created wholly good by an all-good God, then how does evil get any foothold in reality? How does evil rear its ugly head in a primeval sea of goodness initially created by an all-good God?
The solution Augustine eventually reached, his famous theory of the "privatio boni," was inspired by his Platonism. As a philosopher in agreement with Plato on many things, Augustine identified being with goodness. To have being, i.e., "to be," to exist, to be real, is in itself an intrinsically good thing. (Think of it: Isn’t there something intrinsically good about sheer existence? Is existence like a gift?) But being/goodness comes in degrees, for observation reveals that some things have more being or reality than others. For example a picture of the moon, being dependent for its existence on the prior existence of the moon, has less reality than the moon itself which is independent of the picture (as far as its existence goes). Or: the shadow of a cat is not as real as the cat itself, since it is dependent on the cat (and on the Sun) for its being. If the cat moves or the Sun goes down, the shadow may disappear while the cat yet remains in existence. (Like Plato and Aristotle before him, Augustine identified being with independence: the degree of being of a thing is a function of the thing’s ontological independence.)

At the top of the pyramid of being or reality is God, the one most real being, dependent (as far as being goes) on nothing, pure immutable perfection occupying the summit of being called by Plato the Form of the Good. And as in Plato’s system, Augustine held that being/ goodness flows ("overflows" would be a better word) from the top down, from the most real being at the summit down to the least real beings at the bottom of the "Great Chain of Being" we call the universe. Each successive level below the apex of being at the top is occupied by beings with less and less reality (independence) or goodness. However, since being is goodness, to exist at any level of the Great Chain of Being, i.e., to exist to any degree at all, is to participate in goodness to some extent.
So, where does evil come from? Augustine’s ingenious answer was based on this Platonic backdrop and it had two parts: First, if being is goodness, then it follows that evil is non-being. That is, evil is not itself an existent reality at all; it is the absence of being, that is, the lack of goodness (the "privatio boni"). Hence, no level on the pyramid of being is labeled "evil."
Thus, if we were to make a complete inventory of the contents of the universe, our list would include planets and stars and lakes and people and cats and dogs, but it would not contain something that is purely and only "evil."
On Augustine’s theory, evil is like a donut hole. The donut is made of flour, oil, sugar, and so on, but the donut hole is actually not itself a "thing" at all—it is nothing, it is just the absence of donut! Likewise, evil is the lack of being, that is, the lack of goodness.
Ignorance is perhaps a better analogy. What is ignorance? It is nothing more than the absence of knowledge. Notice that knowledge is the positive reality (the good) against which ignorance is contrasted and defined. Likewise, weakness is not anything on its own, it is merely the lack of power-with power being the real thing against which ignorance is to be contrasted.
So no level on the Great Chain is marked "evil." Does the theory of the "Privatio Boni" then mean that evil is an illusion? No. The second part of the theory finishes off the initial question. First of all, love, if it is genuine love, must be freely given not forced. Love is a form of freedom. Second, love is diffusive—it tends by its nature to go out to another, to a separate existence. In addition, real love is also wanted back; however, it must be freely returned or it is again not genuine love. Now, according to Augustine’s arguments, God’s essence is so full of overflowing love and being that God, in a supreme act of love, created a world out of sheer nothing for the purpose of sharing love and being with separately existing creatures. (Thus creation as a voluntary outpouring of being and love.)
Since love is wanted back, and since love must be freely returned if it is real love, God gave part of his creation freedom. Creaturely freedom is an independent power to accept or reject God’s love. Now for the conclusion of Augustine’s solution: Evil originates when a free will, itself a good thing created by God out of nothing, rejects its creator and of its own power turns away in rebellion. Evil comes into the picture when an initially good thing turns of its own power away from the highest good. Rather than seek the light, the creature in rebellion turns toward darkness, toward nonbeing. This is the origin of evil, according to Augustine.
In reply, one might ask: But what causes the will to turn from God? Isn’t the action of the human will itself merely the final result of numerous pre-existing environmental conditions, external circumstances, and genetic predispositions? And on Augustine’s view, isn’t God—as the supreme sovereign of the universe—supposedly the ultimate author of all conditions in the universe? In which case it would seem that God is ultimately the cause or author of evil.
Augustine’s answer to this excellent question is fascinating: First, he argues, if a human will is caused by pre-existing conditions to turn from God toward nonbeing, then that person is not responsible for the turn and cannot be blamed or held accountable. The turn is not the person’s own action. Rather, God is the cause of evil, and is responsible for evil, if God is the cause of the will’s every turn. Yet, argues Augustine, a person is to be praised or blamed for his or her free choices; people are morally responsible. In other words, people have genuine ownership of their free choices. Therefore, it must be that nothing causes a free will to turn from goodness. Rather, what happens is that a free will turns itself; it moves under its own power, it causes itself to move. Otherwise it wouldn’t be a free will. What sometimes happens then, is that a free will, under its own steam, turns from the perfect to a lesser good. The direction of the turn is not ultimately caused by pre-existing conditions or external circumstances or genetics—or it would not be a free choice; the turn is self-caused.
Thus, in Book 2 of the dialogue De Libero Arbitrio, Augustine says to Evodius:
"But perhaps you will ask, `Since the will is moved when it turns away from the unchangeable good to a changeable good, where does that movement, which is clearly evil even though the free will must be counted as good, ….come from?’"
And Augustine answers:
"Perhaps you will be disappointed if, when you question me this way, I reply that I don’t know. I will, however, have replied truly, for what is nothing cannot be known… Therefore, since the movement of turning away, which we agreed is sin, is a defective movement, and since every defect is ex nihilo, from nothing, see where it belongs and you will see, no doubt, that it does not belong to God. Nevertheless, since this defect is voluntary, it has been put in our power."
But Evodius asks again:
"I still want to know why the [good angels] did not sin and why the [evil angels] did sin…If there was no cause, there would not be this distinction among rational creatures. What distinguished them? Don’t give me the answer: "An act of will," for I am looking for the cause of the act of will itself."
Augustine insists on this answer:
"Since an act of will is the cause of sin, and you’re looking for the cause of the act of will itself, if I were to find this cause for you, wouldn’t you then ask for the cause of the cause I found for you? What limit is there to the inquiry; what could bring an end to our examination and inquiry? You must not look for anything beyond the root."
In other words, the "root," a primal act of will, has no cause beyond itself. It is the first step in a series of causes and effects pointed away from God, a series initiated by a free will. Thus, in The City of God, Augustine writes: "To want to find the cause of [a will turning from God] is like wanting to hear darkness or see silence."
Thus, says Augustine, the free will is itself good (since it was created by God). Evil enters the universe de novo when a free will is misused, that is, when it freely turns from God and points in the direction of empty nonbeing. One philosopher has summed up the theory as "Evil is a nothing where something should be." Thus Augustine thought he had explained evil while holding on to both the idea of God’s complete goodness and the original goodness of all creation. Evil is a free will turning away, under its own steam, from God; a will aimed by its owner toward the darkness of nonbeing, toward the nothingness that exists "outside" the pyramid of being. The responsibility thus rests on the creature, not on the creator.
As we saw, theodicy begins with the idea that an all-powerful, all-good, all-knowing being might allow evil to exist if it had a morally sufficient reason. According to Augustine’s theodicy, freedom is that overriding reason. God creates through an act of love, but only free creatures are capable of returning that love.